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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     This appeal raises an interesting question in which the 
defendant complains that the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania has disregarded the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in determining his sentence and he seeks 
compliance with the Guidelines.  The Government, on the other 
hand, opposes his position and supports the court's refusal to 
award a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 
     The defendant had participated with two others in the 
break-in of a department store and had stolen firearms and 
ammunition.  The defendant was arrested and charged in eight 
counts of a seventeen count indictment with conspiracy to steal 
and the theft of firearms from a licensed firearms dealer in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and §§ 922(u) and 2.  Other counts 
of the indictment charged him with disposal and possession of 
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). 
     The defendant initially pled not guilty to the charges but 
ultimately entered into a guilty plea agreement with the 
Government to Count II of the indictment (Theft from a Federal 
Firearms Licensee, Aid and Abet).  At his sentencing, the 
defendant requested a two-level reduction in his offense level 
for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.").   The court 
rejected this request because the defendant had tested positive 
for marijuana and had refused to attend a court-ordered 
rehabilitation program while on pre-trial release pending 
sentencing.  The defendant timely appealed.  We affirm. 
 
                                I. 
     On January 15, 1995, the defendant participated in the 
break-in of a department store in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 
stealing twenty-two handguns, one rifle, one shotgun, and twelve 
boxes of ammunition.  The defendant retained several of the 
stolen firearms, some of which he later sold or gave away.  On 
January 25, 1995, a search of the defendant's residence uncovered 
two handguns, six boxes of ammunition, and thirteen price tags 
which had been removed from the stolen weapons.  At this time, 
the defendant confessed to his role in the theft. 
     After arraignment, the defendant was released on bond with 
pre-trial services supervision.  According to the written 
conditions of his pre-trial release, the defendant was not to 
commit any federal, state, or local offense and he was ordered to 
submit to drug testing and treatment as directed by the Probation 
Office.  The defendant tested for drug usage on seven occasions 
between June 15 and September 20, 1995; five of those tests 
yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana.  The 
defendant acknowledged having used marijuana during this time. 
The pre-sentencing report ("PSR") recommended that the defendant 
not receive a downward adjustment of his offense level for 
acceptance of responsibility under United States Sentencing 
Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 3E1.1 due to his continued marijuana use 
while on pre-trial release.  
     After the fifth positive test result, the defendant 
underwent an evaluation at a drug and alcohol treatment center 
and the evaluation recommended outpatient treatment.  The 
defendant, however, refused to attend outpatient treatment, 
contending that he was unable to afford the sessions and had 
difficulty obtaining transportation to the treatment site.  The 
probation officer, however, reported to the district court that, 
based on his income and expenses, the defendant could afford 
these sessions and that he had made no effort to explain his 
transportation problems to anyone in the probation office. 
     At the sentencing hearing, the district court judge 
accepted the recommendation of the probation officer and denied 
the defendant any acceptance of responsibility reduction due to 
his conduct while on pre-trial release.  The district court, 
having determined that the defendant had an offense level of 14 
and a criminal history category of II, sentenced him to eighteen 
months imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release, 
restitution of $3,425.01, and a special assessment.   
 
 
                               II. 
     The sole issue on appeal presented by the defendant is 
whether the positive drug tests and the failure to participate in 
the drug rehabilitation program that occurred post-indictment and 
before sentencing, which he claims are wholly unrelated to the 
crime charged, can be properly considered by the court in 
determining an acceptance of responsibility reduction for a 
specific offense.  This presents an issue of first impression in 
this court. 
     Section 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines states: "If 
the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility 
for his offense, decrease the offense level by two levels."  
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  The Commentary sets forth a number of 
factors which may be considered in determining whether the 
defendant has demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility under 
§ 3E1.1.  Among the considerations are: 
 
     (a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the 
     offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or 
     not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct 
     for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 
     (Relevant Conduct). . . . ; 
     (b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal 
     conduct or associations;  
     (c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to 
     adjudication of guilt; 
     (d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after 
     commission of the offense; 
     (e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the 
     recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the 
     offense; 
     (f) voluntary resignation from the office or position 
     held during the commission of the offense; 
     (g) post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., 
     counseling or drug treatment); and 
     (h) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in 
     manifesting acceptance of responsibility. 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 1.  The Guidelines make clear 
that this list is not exhaustive. 
     The defendant contends that he showed his intent to accept 
responsibility for the charged offense by his cooperation with 
the federal government, his consent to the search of his 
residence, and his offer of full restitution; he specifically 
points to his surrender to authorities promptly after the 
offense, his assistance in the recovery of the firearms, and the 
timely manifestation of his acceptance of responsibility.  His 
counsel vigorously urges that the defendant is entitled to a two- 
point reduction under § 3E1.1(a).   
     The Government counters that the court is entitled to 
consider a broad range of information when deciding upon an 
appropriate sentence, including the defendant's conduct while on 
pre-trial release.  Thus, if the defendant continues to engage in 
criminal conduct, as he did here, and fails to comply with post- 
offense rehabilitative efforts, the district court is well-within 
its discretion to conclude that the defendant is not truly 
remorseful and has not accepted responsibility for his offense.   
     A district court's factual determination of whether the 
defendant is entitled to an acceptance of responsibility 
reduction in his sentence is reviewed on a clearly erroneous 
standard.  United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 
(3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 869 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  In addition, the Guidelines make clear that "[t]he 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a 
defendant's acceptance of responsibility.  For this reason, the 
determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great 
deference on review."  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 5.  
However, the question of whether the district court correctly 
interpreted U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 is a legal question and subject to 
plenary review.  United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 655 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
     Although this is an issue of first impression in our 
jurisdiction, six other circuits have addressed this issue; five 
of the six have held that the district court is entitled to 
consider criminal conduct committed while the defendant is free 
on bond and did not grant a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.  See United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 196-97 
(8th Cir. 1996) (upholding denial of acceptance of responsibility 
where defendant used marijuana while awaiting a sentence for 
assault with a dangerous weapon); United States v. McDonald, 22 
F.2d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of acceptance of 
responsibility where defendant used cocaine while awaiting 
sentencing for counterfeiting); United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 
599, 600-01 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding denial of acceptance of 
responsibility where defendant used marijuana after committing 
mail theft); United States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 984 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility 
where defendant used cocaine while on release pending sentencing 
for forgery); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1215-16 
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1083 (1990) (holding that 
"the district court acted well within its discretion in 
concluding that appellant's continued use of cocaine cast doubt 
on the sincerity of his avowed acceptance of responsibility" for 
the underlying postal theft offense).  But see United States v. 
Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
acceptance of responsibility considers only conduct related to 
the charged offense). 
     The common thread running through the five circuit cases 
cited above holding that unrelated conduct can be considered 
under § 3E1.1 is the notion that the defendant's post-offense 
conduct can shed significant light on the genuineness of a 
defendant's claimed remorse.  As they have noted, § 3E1.1 does 
not contain any restriction against considering criminal conduct 
unrelated to the specific crime charged and, in fact, § 3E1.1 
application note 1(b) suggests consideration by the court of the 
defendant's "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal 
conduct or associations."  These five courts of appeal agree that 
note 1(b) is phrased in general terms and should be interpreted 
to include criminal conduct committed since the underlying 
offense, even of a different character. 
     In McDonald, 22 F.3d at 144, the court acknowledged that 
while the defendant's continued criminal activity does not 
preclude him from receiving a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, it is properly considered by a sentencing judge 
as it bears on the charged offense.  A guilty plea in acceptance 
of responsibility may be outweighed by conduct that is 
inconsistent with such acceptance.  "A district court may 
conclude that continued criminal activity, such as use of a 
controlled substance, is not consistent with acceptance of 
responsibility."  Id. 
     Counsel for the defendant contends that § 3E1.1(a) of the 
Guidelines directs that examination of the defendant's acceptance 
of responsibility correlates only to conduct related to the 
specific offense before the sentencing court, not to criminal 
conduct in general.  He cites United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 
730 (6th Cir. 1993), where the defendant pled guilty to receipt 
and possession of firearms by a felon.  Morrison sought 
mitigation of his sentence, asserting he accepted responsibility 
by being candid and cooperative with authorities and his early 
guilty plea.  However, subsequent to the indictment and before 
sentencing, he was arrested for stealing a truck, found to be in 
constructive possession of firearms, and tested positive for a 
controlled substance.  The court noted that the language of § 
3E1.1(a) had been changed from "affirmative acceptance of 
personal responsibility for his criminal conduct" to "acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense."  Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735 
n.1.  The court considered this change significant and precluded 
consideration of unrelated criminal conduct in the acceptance of 
responsibility determination.  The Morrison court believed that 
an individual could be truly repentant for one crime and yet 
commit other, unrelated crimes.  Id. at 735 
     We find the reasoning of McDonald and the other circuits 
that held unrelated pre-sentencing conduct may be considered 
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 to be more persuasive.  The language of § 
3E1.1, particularly the factors which may be considered in 
determining whether the defendant has in fact demonstrated an 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense, is very general. 
The language does not specify that the appropriate considerations 
include only conduct related to the charged offense.  Thus, the 
Guidelines appropriately give the sentencing judge the discretion 
to consider post-indictment unlawful conduct in determining 
whether to grant the § 3E1.1 reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.  We conclude that the Guideline change in 
language did not deprive the sentencing court of all discretion 
in considering the defendant's request for a reduction in the 
level of his offense because of his claimed acceptance of 
responsibility for the charged offense.  A mechanical plea or 
confession to an indictment or counts thereof does not 
necessarily evince a genuine sense of remorse or intent to pursue 
lawful conduct.  The Commentary to the Guidelines referred to 
above recognize that the sentencing judge will still retain a 
reasonable amount of discretion despite the change in the 
Guideline language.  Among factors to be considered by the judge 
are not only the truthful admission by the defendant of the 
conduct compromising the offense(s) but also his or her voluntary 
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct and post-offense 
rehabilitation efforts.  These bear on an important aspect of any 
criminal sentence -- the defendant's genuine feeling of remorse 
and his or her rehabilitation efforts.  Continual criminal 
activity, even differing in nature from the convicted offense, is 
inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility and an interest 
in rehabilitation. 
     A significant factor in the instant case are the conditions 
incorporated in the order of the court releasing the defendant on 
bail.  One of these conditions obligated the defendant not to 
commit any offense in violation of federal, state or local law 
while on release.  This term was an express condition of the 
defendant's pre-trial release and, when violated, constituted 
grounds for revocation of bail.  Thus, violation of this 
condition could be appropriately considered by the district court 
in determining whether the defendant should be granted a 
reduction in his offense level. 
     Another condition required defendant to submit to drug 
testing and/or treatment as directed by the probation office.  At 
the time, Ceccarani refused counseling for his drug habit; he 
represented that he couldn't afford the $30 per visit counseling 
fee, although he was earning about $1000 per month with necessary 
expenses of only $200 per month.  Application Note 1(g) permits 
the court to consider the defendant's post-rehabilitative efforts 
in weighing his acceptance of responsibility.  If a defendant's 
efforts to obtain rehabilitation can be considered in his favor, 
certainly a defendant's refusal to enter drug counseling, even 
when directed to do so by court order, may be considered as an 
unfavorable factor in determining whether the defendant is 
entitled to a reduction in his offense level for accepting 
responsibility for the convicted offense.  We therefore hold that 
a sentencing judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, 
consider unlawful conduct committed by the defendant while on 
pre-trial release awaiting sentencing as well as any violations 
of the conditions of this pre-trial release in determining 
whether the court should grant a reduction in the offense level 
for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 
     In the instant case, the defendant tested positive on five 
separate occasions while out on bail and rejected the opportunity 
for drug counseling and treatment, displaying arrogance and 
defiance of the court and the law.  This entitled Chief Judge 
Kosik, an experienced and able trial judge, in the exercise of 
his discretion, to reject the requested reduction.  Therefore, 
having determined that the positive drug tests and the refusal to 
enter rehabilitation were appropriate factors for the district 
court to consider under § 3E1.1, we cannot conclude that the 
district court's determination that the defendant was not 
entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction was clearly 
erroneous.   
      
                               III. 
     Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
